Beyond Strategic Necessity: Building a Trusted EU-Türkiye Alliance for Shared Prosperity

Turkey’s increasing importance to European security provides an opportunity for a historical decision. They can maintain the existing paradigm where collaboration happens during emergencies while differences of interest result in disagreements regarding issues like immigration, Cyprus, maritime borders, democracy, and Europeanness.

Or they can change their unavoidable interdependence into a structured and accountable partnership.

This convergence is not so much about political accommodation or cultural rapprochement but rather about more difficult facts of life such as the threat from Russia to Europe’s security, conflicts within the neighborhood of Europe, uncertainty about America’s commitments, strain on defense-industrial capabilities in Europe, insecure energy and transport corridors, and unresolved immigration problems.

It is for this exact reason that care needs to be exercised. Strategic necessity could lead to collaboration without leading to trust. If this evolving relationship is not formalized, it will only be a string of ad hoc arrangements and not an enduring arrangement.

The aim is not to have the Türkiye’s society assimilated into the culturally homogeneous society of Europe or to make Europe dependent on Turkish military capability. The aim is to establish a rules-based strategic compact between political equals.

In terms of the Natural Rights Led Governance (NRLG) framework, this partnership needs to rest not just on the need for strategic necessity but the need to safeguard human dignity, sovereignty and mutual accountability. NRLG emphasizes that durable alliances emerge when governance frameworks align with universal rights, security, liberty, fairness, and dignity, rather than purely transactional interests.

Türkiye is no longer merely Europe’s southeastern flank

For decades, Türkiye has been seen as NATO’s awkward but indispensable geographic member, appreciated for its strategic importance, yet kept at arm’s length politically. This perception is no longer valid.

NATO even acknowledges that Türkiye has the second-largest army in the Alliance and emphasizes the strategic importance of the country in securing access to the Black Sea via the Turkish Straits from the Mediterranean. Additionally, the 7-8 July 2026 NATO Summit took place in Ankara.

The defence-industrial capabilities of Türkiye are developing rapidly. According to the Turkish Secretariat of Defence Industries, the total value of the country’s defence and aerospace exports amounted to around $10.05 billion annually; annual sector turnover stood at around $20 billion; the number of companies in the field exceeded 3,500, and the number of employees was above 100,000. Clearly,Türkiye is switching from consumption of allied defence technology to creation of its own defence-industrial capacities.

As an illustrative example, one can point to the Leonardo-Baykar partnership. In December 2022, the Italian company and Baykar signed an agreement to create a 50-50 joint venture to integrate Turkish technological and manufacturing expertise into European production, certification, mission systems, and industrial chain. As Brookings notes, it is a transition of Türkiye from an external supplier to a partner in a significant European defence ecosystem.

It may become a pattern of the further cooperation with Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania, the UK, and other European states. However, it does not equal an EU-Türkiye security policy framework.

From an NRLG perspective, such partnerships should evolve into rights-aligned industrial ecosystems, where labour standards, intellectual property fairness, and equitable value distribution are embedded into cooperation frameworks-ensuring that economic integration reinforces human dignity rather than creating asymmetrical dependencies.

Where the trust deficit lies

The disagreement is often presented as a civilizational conflict between Europe’s Christian heritage and Türkiye’s Muslim identity. That interpretation is politically convenient but analytically weak.

Religion influence’s identity politics, electoral debates, Islamophobia and arguments over whether Türkiye is “European.” However, most operational disputes are institutional and geopolitical, which are as follows:

1. Türkiye’s stalled EU accession process;

2. the unresolved Cyprus conflict;

3. Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean maritime disputes;

4. disagreements over Syria, Russia and regional sanctions;

5. concerns regarding democratic governance and judicial independence;

6. the consequences of Türkiye’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system;

7. Türkiye’s subsequent exclusion from the F-35 program and related US sanctions;

8. resistance among some EU members to treating Türkiye as a strategic peer rather than an external supplier;

The European Commission still views Türkiye as a candidate country and an important partner but asserts that the negotiations for the accession process have stalled due to the serious democratic backsliding, lack of judicial independence and fundamental freedoms. The EU Commission links further cooperation to developments regarding the Cyprus problem, international laws, friendly relations and respect for obligations of the Customs Union.

Conversely, the case of S-400/F-35 represents the price of strategic uncertainty. The situation affected the credibility of Türkiye’s defence orientation as well as resulted in sanctions and technology denial despite being a must for NATO operations. The negotiations in July 2026 revealed that both sides, Turkey and US, wanted to resolve the dispute but it served as an example of the price to be paid for unconsulted security choices.

The existing trust deficit is, indeed, real, but not permanent or mainly religious in nature.

NRLG adds a critical insight here: trust deficits persist when governance systems fail to consistently uphold natural rights across all actors. Selective application of legal norms, unequal treatment, or politicized enforcement undermines legitimacy. A rights-consistent framework would reduce suspicion by ensuring that all parties are held to the same foundational standards.

A proposed EU-Türkiye Strategic Compact 2035

1. Establish a formal EU-Türkiye Security and Resilience Partnership

The EU has already developed security and defense partnerships with several other nations that do not belong to the union, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Japan, South Korea, India and Australia. There is no structural reason why an EU-Turkey partnership cannot happen.

A dedicated EU–Türkiye partnership must include topics such as Black Sea and Mediterranean security, cyberattacks and hybrid threats, terrorism and organized crime, prtotection of energy, transport, and digital infrastructure, maritime security, disaster management, defense industry resilience, peacekeeping and crisis management, supply chain security, and coordinated responses to regional instability.

The partnership should not be unconditional. Participation should require transparent procurement, information-security safeguards, end-use accountability, anti-corruption measures and compliance with jointly agreed security standards.

The governing principle should be Institutional access in exchange for measurable alignment, not automatic inclusion, but not permanent exclusion either.

Under NRLG, this partnership should also embed rights-based accountability mechanisms, ensuring that security cooperation does not compromise civilian protections, due process, or humanitarian obligations.

2. Negotiate Türkiye’s structured participation in SAFE

The EU’s Security Action for Europe, or SAFE, provides up to €150 billion in long-term loans to support joint procurement and expand Europe’s defence-industrial capacity. However, SAFE requires that no more than 35% of component costs originate from outside the EU, Ukraine or the eligible European Economic Area and European Free Trade Association countries. Wider participation by another country requires a specific agreement with the EU.

This creates a paradox. Europe needs Türkiye’s production capacity, cost competitiveness, geographical position and operational experience, yet EU rules limit the scale of Turkish participation. The solution should not be the wholesale removal of European industrial safeguards. Instead, the EU and Türkiye should negotiate a dedicated agreement under which Turkish companies receive expanded access when they- 

1. establish verifiable European-Turkish joint production;

2. protect sensitive data and intellectual property;

3. comply with European export and security standards;

4. provide reciprocal market access;

5. avoid technological dependencies on states considered security risks;

6. create employment and industrial value on both sides;

7. accept transparent oversight of public financing.

   
   

Such an agreement would turn Türkiye from a peripheral supplier into a regulated co-producer of European security.

NRLG would further require that such arrangements ensure fair labour conditions, equitable profit-sharing, and transparency in public resource allocation, preventing exploitation or unequal benefit distribution.

3. Decouple functional security cooperation from full EU membership

Türkiye’s EU membership process should not be formally abandoned, but neither should every practical field of cooperation remain frozen until accession becomes politically possible.

Security integration, disaster management, critical-infrastructure protection, climate cooperation, trade modernization and research partnerships can advance without predetermining the outcome of the accession debate.

The Leonardo-Baykar model shows that corporate and bilateral integration can proceed even when larger political negotiations are blocked. Similar models could be developed in civilian aerospace, cybersecurity, satellite systems, maritime monitoring, emergency response and dual-use innovation.

However, bilateral arrangements alone are insufficient. Without an EU-level framework, European states may compete separately for Turkish capacity while avoiding collective responsibility for resolving the political relationship.

The objective should therefore be phased into functional integration, with each new level of cooperation tied to clear benchmarks. NRLG reinforces this approach by advocating incremental legitimacy-building, where each phase of integration is validated by measurable improvements in rights protection, transparency, and institutional fairness.

4. Create a no-surprise security doctrine

A trusted ally does not necessarily agree with every decision. But it should not make major decisions after they have already altered the regional security environment. Türkiye and the EU should adopt a no-surprise doctrine requiring advance consultation before decisions that could materially affect one another, including major regional military deployments; acquisition of sensitive strategic systems from geopolitical rivals; sanctions affecting critical trade or energy flows; cross-border operations; restrictions on defence-industrial cooperation; and major changes in Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean or Syrian policy.

The mechanism should include ministerial consultations, military hotlines, advance notification of significant exercises, classified-information arrangements and emergency de-escalation procedures.

The S-400 crisis should be treated as a case study in how not to manage allied disagreement.

From an NRLG standpoint, this doctrine reflects the principle of predictability as a natural right of states and societies, reducing insecurity caused by unilateral actions.

5. Provide parallel security gains for Greece and Cyprus

No durable EU–Türkiye partnership can be built by asking Greece or Cyprus simply to ignore their security concerns.

At the same time, neither Greece nor Cyprus should be able to make the entirety of EU–Türkiye cooperation permanently hostage to unresolved disputes. The correct approach is parallel reassurance.

Greater Turkish access to European security structures should proceed alongside a) Aegean incident-prevention mechanisms; b) regular military-to-military communication; c) mutual restraint in contested waters; d) renewed confidence-building measures; e) legal or negotiated pathways for maritime delimitation; f) support for a comprehensive Cyprus settlement under an agreed international framework; g) guarantees that EU-supported capabilities will not be used to intensify intra-alliance disputes.

Türkiye should gain inclusion, investment and recognition. Greece and Cyprus should gain predictability, restraint and stronger dispute-management mechanisms. France and other concerned European powers should likewise receive enforceable guarantees regarding strategic autonomy, export controls and protection of sensitive technologies.

A successful agreement cannot produce one obvious winner and several humiliated participants. Every principal actor must be able to demonstrate a concrete security gain. NRLG strengthens this by insisting on equitable security outcomes, where no party’s fundamental rights or sovereignty are subordinated to another’s strategic advantage.

6. Modernize the Customs Union

Security cooperation cannot remain isolated from economics. EU–Türkiye trade in goods reached approximately €217.5 billion in 2025, making Türkiye the EU’s fifth-largest goods-trading partner. The EU received around 42.7% of Türkiye’s goods exports, while remaining Türkiye’s largest trade partner by a substantial margin.

Yet the Customs Union remains limited in scope and does not adequately cover services, digital trade, most agricultural products, public procurement or contemporary environmental standards. The European Commission has recommended modernization, but negotiations have remained politically blocked.

A modernized framework should include a) services and digital trade; b) public procurement; agricultural and food trade; c) investment protection; d) competition and state-aid disciplines; e) carbon-border measures; f) labour protections; g) environmental accountability bases on natural law; h) dispute-resolution mechanisms; and i) consultation when EU agreements with third countries affect Türkiye.

Economic integration would deepen the constituencies that benefit from stable relations, making political confrontation more costly for both sides.

NRLG would ensure that this integration is rights-centered, embedding protection for workers, consumers, and communities, and preventing economic arrangements that undermine social equity or environmental sustainability.

7. Replace migration bargaining with shared responsibility

Migration cooperation has too often been framed as a crude exchange: Europe provides money, while Türkiye prevents refugees and migrants from reaching European territory.

That is neither sustainable nor dignified.

As of August 2025, Türkiye was supporting approximately 2.7 million refugees, including around 2.5 million Syrians under temporary protection. The EU had allocated almost €12.5 billion since 2011 for refugees and host communities, including support for education, health, municipal infrastructure and basic needs.

A new compact EU–Türkiye migration framework should provide a) predictable multi-year assistance; b) direct support for host Turkish municipalities; c) education and employment opportunities; d) expanded European resettlement; e) legal labour-mobility pathways into Europe; f) action against trafficking networks; g) voluntary and safe return arrangements; h) independent human-rights monitoring; and i) a prohibition on using displaced people as instruments of political pressure.

Migration management must become a shared humanitarian and development responsibility rather than a recurring diplomatic threat.

NRLG reinforces this by framing migration as a natural-rights issue, where displaced individuals retain inherent dignity and rights regardless of geopolitical bargaining.

8. Build nature-smart energy, transport and climate security together

Türkiye links Europe with the Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and Mediterranean. This makes it crucial not only for conventional security but also for trade, logistics, energy and digital connectivity.

The EU itself identifies resilient transport, energy and digital connections through Türkiye and the Southern Caucasus toward Central Asia as a strategic interest.

Cooperation should extend beyond fossil-fuel transit and include a) interconnected nature-smart renewable-electricity systems; b) grid modernization and storage; c) nature-smart and resilient ports; low-carbon shipping; d) earthquake-resistant infrastructure; e) wildfire and disaster-response systems; f) sustainable transport corridors; g) water-security cooperation; h) ecosystem restoration; i) nature-smart agriculture; and j) critical-mineral recycling and circular manufacturing.

This would broaden the relationship beyond defense and reduce the danger of making it dependent on military crises.

NRLG contributes by emphasizing natural rights as fundamental, ensuring that economic activities do not compromise ecological sustainability or future generations’ well-being.

9. Establish a European-Anatolian Knowledge and Innovation Area

Long-term alliances are sustained less by leaders’ declarations than by relationships among universities, businesses, researchers, municipalities and citizens.

A European-Anatolian Knowledge and Innovation Area could support artificial intelligence; cybersecurity; public health; earthquake science; agricultural technologies; nature-smart renewable energy; climate resilience; satellite observation; water management; and cultural preservation.

Research and partnerships should be based on co-ownership, shared intellectual property, joint training and reciprocal mobility-not on a hierarchy in which Europe owns the technology while Türkiye merely supplies labour or manufacturing capacity.

NRLG would ensure knowledge equity, where innovation benefits are shared fairly and access to technological advancement is not restricted by structural inequalities.

10. Make political trust reciprocal

The EU is justified in raising concerns about judicial independence, democratic pluralism, media freedom, due process and civil-society space in Türkiye. The European Commission’s recent assessments identify serious deterioration in several of these areas.

But Europe also undermines its credibility when it tolerates Islamophobia, discriminatory rhetoric, unequal visa treatment or arguments suggesting that a Muslim-majority society can never fully belong within Europe’s political order.

Türkiye should commit to measurable progress on judicial independence; implementation of binding natural-rights decisions; due process; freedom of expression; academic and media freedom; transparent procurement; protection of lawful political opposition; and citizens and/or community participation.

The EU should commit to measurable progress on combating anti-Muslim discrimination; fair and predictable visa procedures; protection of Turkish and Muslim communities; rejection of civilizational exclusion; consistent application of human-rights standards; and objective rather than identity-based criteria for cooperation.

Values cannot build trust when invoked selectively.

NRLG underscores that reciprocity must be grounded in universal rights, not selective enforcement or political convenience.

Move beyond “civilizational fit”: From conflict to convergence

The long history of European-Ottoman conflict cannot be reduced to theology. The traditional debate “Is Türkiye a part of Europe?” has lost its relevance. Instead, the relevant question should be this, “Can Europe and Türkiye create a common security, economy and culture without the surrender of either civilization?”

Religion frequently provides political legitimacy and public mobilization. But conflicts were also driven by empire, territorial expansion, control of trade routes, dynastic competition, nationalism, resource access and geopolitical balancing.

Modern disputes over Cyprus, maritime zones, airspace, defence procurement and regional influence would not automatically disappear if both sides shared the same religion.

This distinction matters because diagnosing the relationship as an inevitable clash of civilizations makes peaceful accommodation appear impossible. Diagnosing it as a conflict of interests and institutions makes negotiation possible.

While religion persists in the internal politics of Europe, through issues related to Muslim identity, migration, Islamophobia and whether Türkiye is “European enough,” such debates are merely stand-ins for identity issues. The real questions are territorial, legal, institutional, and strategic.

NRLG reframes this further, conflicts persist when governance systems fail to align universal rights and equitable power distribution, not because of inherent civilizational incompatibility.

Convergence must not mean assimilation

Civilizational convergence should not require Türkiye to dilute its Islamic, Anatolian or Turkic identity. Nor should European societies be required to abandon their Christian, secular, liberal or national traditions.

Convergence should mean agreement on how different identities coexist under common rules. It should be based on-

• Equal civilizational dignity: Neither Europe nor Türkiye should present itself as culturally superior or naturally entitled to instruct the other.

• Honest historical education: Shared programs should examine wars, imperial rule, forced displacement, colonialism, minority suffering and nationalism, but also centuries of trade, diplomacy, migration, scientific exchange, literature, architecture and coexistence.

• No inherited collective guilt: Present generations should learn from historical injustice without being treated as personally responsible for every action of former empires or states.

• Secular governance without hostility to religion: Public institutions should protect equal citizenship and freedom of conscience. Secularism should not become hostility toward Muslim identity, while religious majoritarianism should not weaken the rights of minorities or non-believers.

• Permanent societal exchange: Universities, schools, museums, journalists, religious leaders, artists, youth groups, women’s organizations, municipalities and diaspora communities should be connected through long-term programs.

These engagements must go beyond ceremonial interfaith events. They should address difficult subjects directly: Islamophobia, secularism, empire, nationalism, minority rights, migration and competing historical memories.

NRLG supports this by promoting pluralistic coexistence grounded in equal rights, ensuring diversity strengthens rather than destabilizes societies.

A practical win-win framework

Sector	European gain	Turkish gain	Required safeguard
Civilizational relations	Reduced polarization and stronger social cohesion	Equal recognition of Muslim and Turkish identity	Freedom of religion
Diplomacy	Wider regional influence	Greater legitimacy	Parallel dispute-resolution tracks
Collective security	Strategic depth, regional deterrence and stronger Black Sea-Mediterranean capacity	Institutional recognition and deeper participation	No-surprise consultation and dispute-management rules
Defense industry	Capacity, deterrence, Expanded production, innovation and diversified supply chains, industrial depth	Market access, investment and technological partnership	Security screening, export controls and joint oversight
Economy	Near-shoring and resilient supply chains	Investment and trade stability	Customs Union modernization
Trade	Integrated production base and a major nearby market	Stable access to Türkiye’s largest export market	Modern Customs Union and binding dispute settlement
Migration	More orderly and humane management	Shared financial and social responsibility	Refugee protection and prohibition of political instrumentalization
Energy and connectivity	Diversified and resilient corridors	Investment, transit benefits and energy security	Avoidance of fossil-fuel lock-in and ecological harm
Technology	Skilled workforce and complementary industrial capacity	Research finance, knowledge transfer and innovation	Shared intellectual property and data protection
Climate resilience	Stronger regional adaptation and disaster preparedness	Lower vulnerability and new economic opportunities	Community, ecosystem and natural-rights safeguards
Culture	Reduced polarization	Equal civilizational dignity	Anti-discrimination commitments

Conclusion

Türkiye is already part of European security, geography, commerce and history, whether it becomes an EU member. The European continent will remain central to the future and development of technology and the economy of Türkiye regardless of whether Ankara will accept all political demands of Europe.

The question, thus, is not about the partnership or about disengagement; the choice is rather about, an unstable, transactional, and often hostile relationship, or regulated, accountable, and beneficial strategic partnership.

The EU should realize that Türkiye is a partner in European security rather than just a buffer zone. The government of Türkiye should show that it seeks partnership within institutionalized rules, not just in strategic bargaining.

Civilizational convergence will be successful not when one party defeats or assimilates another, but when both parties realize that their well-being cannot be separated anymore.

*M. Zakir Hossain Khan, Proponent of Transformative Natural Rights Led Governance Framework; Co-Founder and Managing Director, Change Initiative, a global think tank; and Editor in Chief, Nature Insights. Email: zhkhan@changei.earth

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Author: M. Zakir Hossain Khan

Originally published in: Change Initiative

This article is republished for archival and informational purposes. All rights remain with the original publisher.